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Principles of Internet Privacy
FRED H. CATE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Paul Schwartz's Internet Privacy and the State makes an important and
original contribution to the privacy debate that is currently raging by be-
ginning the process of framing a new and more useful understanding of
what "privacy" is and why and how it should be protected.' The definition
developed by Brandeis, Warren,2 and Prosser,3 and effectively codified by
Alan Westin in 1967---"the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others"---worked well in a world in which most
privacy concerns involved physical intrusions (usually by the government)
or public disclosures (usually by the media), which, by their very nature,
were comparatively rare and usually discovered.
But that definition's exclusive focus on individual control has grown
incomplete in a world in which most privacy concerns involve data that we
inevitably generate in torrents as we go through our lives in an increasingly
computerized, networked environment, and which can be collected and
used by virtually anyone, usually without us knowing anything about it.
Moreover, in this information economy, data have real value, especially
when combined with other data, and the resources required to collect and
use data are comparatively inexpensive and widely available. In this
world, few of us have the awareness and expertise to consider trying to
* Professor of Law, Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, and Director of the Infornr.atlon Law and
Commerce Institute, Indiana Uniersity School of Lm-Bloomlngton: Senior Counselfor Informatlon
Law, Ice, Miller. Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, IN.
1. See Paul M. Schwarzz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L REV. 815 (2000).
2. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Prhcy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193
(1890).
3. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L REV. 383 (1960).
4. ALAN F. WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
control all of the data we generate. Few of us have the time or frankly,
even the incentive to attempt to do so, and the sheer volume of data, variety
of sites where they are collected and used, and economic incentive for do-
ing so would make the attempt laughably futile.
So Professor Schwartz's contribution is both valuable and timely as it
helps us appreciate the limits of our current understanding of privacy, and
the need for developing a more expansive definition. To be sure, I do not
agree with all of Professor Schwartz's analysis, but I agree wholeheartedly,
even if for sometimes different reasons, with his conclusion that it is time
to look for a better definition of privacy.
This is not to suggest that individual control should not be part of our
understanding of privacy, but rather that it can no longer reasonably be
considered the only part. That "privacy" means more than just individual
control of information and the government's involvement in protecting
privacy, as Professor Schwartz argues, both says something important
about, and significantly influences individual participation in, our democ-
racy and society. Professor Schwartz describes this broader vision of pri-
vacy as "constitutive privacy," which, he argues, reflects the understanding
that "access to personal information and limits on it help form the society
in which we live and shape our individual identities."5 As a result, Profes-
sor Schwartz writes: "The proper social response to information privacy
issues cannot be to maximize secrecy about individuals and their
pursuits."6 Rather, our new understanding of privacy should reflect the fact
that the State "has a positive role to play in shaping the privacy market and
privacy norms" 7 and that those norms will not be bright-line rules but in-
stead "shifting, multidimensional data preserves that insulate personal data
from different kinds of observation by different parties.' 8 Again, I agree
entirely, as will, I suspect, most readers.
But what does this mean, practically, in this new millennium in the
context of the Internet? What principles should undergird the govern-
ment's involvement in attempting to craft privacy norms? These questions
remain mostly unanswered in Professor Schwartz's article, in large part
because they are beyond the scope of his sophisticated, theoretical analysis.
He writes that his definition of "constituitive privacy" argues for the State
to "concentrate its activities in two areas: (1) assisting in the creation and
maintenance of the conditions for a functioning privacy market, and (2)
supporting development of privacy norms that protect against too great a
rate of preference falsification." 9 But I am unclear what this would mean
5. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 834.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 859.
8. Id. at 834.
9. Id. at 854.
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in reality, or why it supports his conclusion in passing that Congress' re-
cent rejection of its 1994 requirement that states provide drivers with an
opportunity to "opt-out" of the use of state Department of Motor Vehicles
drivers' license and motor vehicle records (DMV records) for marketing
and surveys, in favor of a new requirement that states prohibit such uses
unless drivers "opt-in" to them is "effective action to establish and protect
positive feedback for a privacy norm."
10
I would like to take advantage of the important process that Professor
Schwartz has begun of redefining our understanding of what privacy
means, especially in the context of the Internet, by considering briefly
those principles that undergird the government's efforts to protect privacy
and craft privacy norms. Part II of this Article suggests five principles that
should guide government legislative and regulatory activities concerning
privacy. While this list is necessarily brief and, therefore, likely incom-
plete, it provides at least a glimpse of what State regulation might be ap-
propriate in the face of the broader, more subtle understanding of privacy
that Professor Schwartz has proposed. Finally, in Part III, I apply those
principles to Professor Schwartz's specific example of a practical applica-
tion of "constitutive privacy," cited above, to suggest that far from demon-
strating "effective action to establish and protect positive feedback for a
privacy norm,"1 Congress's recent action to close DMV records under-
mines the creation of thoughtful, rational privacy norms.
II. PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICYMAKING
Judicial precedent, historical experience, and common sense suggest
five principles that have undergirded, and should continue to guide, gov-
ernment policymaking with regard to information.
A. The Importance of Balance
The first principle is the concept of balance. This may seem so obvi-
ous as to not be worth stating, but the United States has historically bal-
anced competing interests, particularly with regard to information, to de-
termine for what purposes and by what means the government may inter-
fere with private information flows, or engage in the collection and dis-
semination of information itself. Identifying the constitutional standard by
which those balances are achieved has been one of the major tasks of the
Supreme Court in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Court has
promulgated a plethora of standards to be applied variously, for example,
to government regulations that discriminate against a small group of speak-
10. Id.at 858.
11. Id. at 857.
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ers,12 restrict expression on the basis of viewpoint or prior to its being pub-
lished,13 regulate conduct intrinsically intertwined with expression, 14 affect
only the time, place, or manner of expression,15 refulate expression on
public property,16 restrain commercial expression,' or compel expres-
sion.'
All of these and the Court's other information-related standards have
one thing in common: They accord considerable protection to expression
12. Such cases typically require "strict scrutiny," under which "the State must show that its regula-
tion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Ar-
kansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). As articulated in Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'n, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), the test required that the State assert an
interest "of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without" the regulation. Id. at 585. None-
theless, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, the Court does not require that the means be the least
restrictive available. Strict scrutiny applies to most "discriminatory restriction[s] or prohibitlon[s] of
speech... ?' Arkansas Writers'Project, 481 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v, Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
14. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court
that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct," govern-
ment regulation of that conduct is:
sufficientiy justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; Ifit furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
I't at 376-77.
15. Regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression are constitutional if they "are content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45
(1983).
16. The Supreme Court has identified three types of public fora: "the traditional public forum, the
public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum." Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). Traditional public fora are defined by
the objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, "by long tradition or by government fiat,"
the property has been "devoted to assembly and debate." Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45). The
government can exclude a speaker from a traditional public forum "only when the exclusion Is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest."
Id at 800. Designated public fora are created by purposeful governmental action. See id. at 802. If the
government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated public forum Is made
generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny. See Id at 800. Other government properties
are nonpublic fora or effectively not fora at all. See Id at 803. The government can restrict access to a
nonpublic forum "as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expres-
sion merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 800 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at
46).
17. "Commercial speech," which the Court has found is accorded less constitutional protection, Is
evaluated under a four-part test: the expression at issue "must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading"; the asserted governmental interest must be "substantial;" the regulation must be one that
"directly advances the governmental interest asserted;" Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v, Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); and must be narrowly tailored to achieve the desired ends,
See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,477-81 (1989).
18. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943), Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716
(1977), the Court required that the government action be reviewed under "strict scrutiny."
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and the communication of information, requiring in virtually every cas6
that the government have a "compelling" or "substantial" interest and that
its regulation be "narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest. I will return
to this point below.
In addition, all of these tests require that courts engage in their own
independent balancing. Across-the-board legislative or regulatory assess-
ments are insufficient where constitutional interests are at stake. Consider
just one example. The state of Massachusetts adopted a statute which re-
quired trial court judges to close all criminal trials when minor victims of
sexual offenses testified.19 In 1982, the Supreme Court struck dowvn the
statute, in part, as unconstitutional? It is difficult to imagine a stronger
privacy interest than that of minor victims of sexual offenses who must
testify at trial. But even in that instance, the Supreme Court said that the
State may not enact an across-the-board rule closing trials. It stated that
"in individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the First
Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from the
courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony of minor
sex-offense victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized
determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional."2' Laws that put in
place broad restrictions on the flow of information, rather than require sen-
sitive balances to prevent specified harms, are constitutionally problematic.
So, this first principle suggests not only the importance of balance, but
also that when that balance involves expression, the government bears an
historically great burden, and courts reviewing its actions must engage in a
careful, specific weighing of the interests at stake. The remaining princi-
ples reflect those interests that the Supreme Court has identified as most
relevant.
B. Open Information Flows
Perhaps the most important consideration when balancing restrictions
on information is the historical importance of the free flow of information.
The free flow concept is one that is not only enshrined in the First
Amendment, but frankly in any form of democratic or market economy. In
the United States, we have placed extraordinary importance on the open
flow of information. As the Federal Reserve Board noted in its report to
Congress on data protection in financial institutions, "it is the freedom to
speak, supported by the availability of information and the free-flow of
data, that is the cornerstone of a democratic society and market econ-
19. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16A (1998).
20. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
21. Id. at 611 n.27 (emphasis added).
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The significance of open data flows is reflected in the constitutional
provisions not only for freedom of expression, but for copyrights-to pro-
mote the creation and dissemination of expression, and for a post office-
to deliver the mail and the news.23 Federal regulations demonstrate a
sweeping preference for openness, reflected in the Freedom of Information
Act,2 Government in the Sunshine Act,25 and dozens of other laws appli-
cable to the government. There are even more laws requiring disclosure by
private industry, such as the regulatory disclosures required by securities
and commodities laws, banking and insurance laws, and many others.
26
This is a very basic tenet of the society in which we live. Laws that restrict
that free flow almost always conflict with this basic principle. That does
not mean that such laws are never upheld, but merely that they face a con-
siderable constitutional hurdle.
This is done with good reason. Open information flows are not only
essential to self-governance; they have also generated significant, practical
benefits. The ready availability of personal information helps businesses
"deliver the right products and services to the right customers, at the right
time, more effectively and at lower cost," Fred Smith, founder and Presi-
dent of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, has written.27 Federal Reserve
Board Governor Edward Gramlich testified before Congress in July 1999
that "[i]nformation about individuals' needs and preferences is the corner-
stone of any system that allocates goods and services within an
economy."'28 The more such information is available, he continued, "the
more accurately and efficiently will the economy meet those needs and
preferences."
29
22. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress Concerning the
Availability of Consumer Identi4ng Information and Financial Fraud, 2 (1997)
<http'//www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/RpCongresdprivacy.pdfi.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
25. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
26. See, e.g., Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1994)); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1693-1693r (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520, 2701-2709 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(1994)); Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994)); Customer Proprietary
Network Information provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp. Ill
1997)); and the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998)).
27. Fred L. Smith, Jr., Better to Share Information, DESEREr News (Salt Lake City, Utah), Oct. 14,
1999, atA22, available in LEXIS, News Library, Deseret News File.
28. Financial Privacy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit of the Comm on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (1999)
available at <http://www.house.govibanking/72199grahtm> [hereinafter Financial Privacy Hearings)




Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has been perhaps the
most articulate spokesperson for the extraordinary value of accessible per-
sonal information. In 1998, he wrote to Congressman Ed Markey (D-
Mass.):
A critical component of our ever more finely hewn competitive
market system has been the plethora of information on the charac-
teristics of customers both businesses and individuals. Such in-
formation has enabled producers and marketers to fine tune pro-
duction schedules to the ever greater demands of our consuming
public for diversity and individuality of products and services.
Newly devised derivative products, for example, have enabled fi-
nancial institutions to unbundle risk in a manner that enables those
desirous of taking on that risk (and potential reward) to do so, and
those that chose otherwise, to be risk averse. It has enabled finan-
cial institutions to offer a wide variety of customized insurance and
other products.
Detailed data obtained from consumers as they seek credit or
make product choices help engender the whole set of sensitive
price signals that are so essential to the functioning of an advanced
information based economy such as ours.30
As just one example of these practical benefits, Walter Kitchenman has
calculated that mortgage rates in the United States are as much as two full
percentage points lower because of the rapid availability of standardized,
reliable consumer credit information. 31 With outstanding mortgage rates
approaching $4 trillion, American consumers save as much as $80 billion a
year because of the efficiency and liquidity that information makes possi-
ble. Such information further reduces the cost of financial services by fa-
cilitating the prevention and early detection of fraud, debt collection ef-
forts, and nationwide competition and consumer mobility, thereby in-
creasing both the availability of, and the range of people who qualify for,
credit.
In a recent report on public record information, Richard Vain, Chief
Information Officer of the State of Iowa, and I examined the critical roles
played by public record information in our economy and society. We con-
cluded that such information constitutes part of this nation's "essential in-
frastructure," the benefits of which are "so numerous and diverse that they
30. Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, to EdArd J. Markey, Repre-
sentative, U.S. House of Representatives, July 28, 1998, available al <http'Avwwjihousegov Imarkey
/9807281etter.htm>.
31. See WALTER F. KITCENMAN, U.S. CREDIT REPORTING: PERCEIVED Bwurrs OuTVEGH
PRIVACY CONCERNS 7 (1999), available at <httpJ/wvww.towergoup.om/Seac~hidtchernasp>.
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impact virtually every facet of American life....,,3 2 The ready availability
of public record data "facilitates a vibrant economy, improves efficiency,
reduces costs, creates jobs, and provides valuable products and services
that people want."
33
Perhaps most importantly, widely accessible personal information has
helped to create a democratization of opportunity in the United States.
Anyone can go almost anywhere, make purchases from vendors they will
never see, maintain accounts with banks they will never visit, and obtain
credit far from home all because of open information flows. Americans
can take advantage of opportunities based on their records, on what they
have done rather than who they know, because access to consumer infor-
mation makes it possible for distant companies and creditors to make ra-
tional decisions about doing business with individuals. The open flow of
information gives consumers real choice. This is what the open flow of
information principle reflect, not just the constitutional importance of in-
formation flows, but their significant economic and social benefits as well.
C. The Meaning of "Private"
The third principle reflects a complex, but sophisticated understanding
of "privacy." Individual privacy is highly protected in U.S. law from intru-
sions by the government. In fact, it would not be an overstatement to say
that the Constitution reflects the conviction that the greatest threat to indi-
vidual liberty is the government. As a result, rights articulated in the Con-
stitution generally are protected only against government actions. Only the
Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery, applies directly to private
parties.34 All other constitutional rights-whether to speak freely, confront
accusers, or be tried by a jury of one's peers-regulate the public, but not
the private, sector.
One dominant theme of constitutional rights is the protection of citi-
zens from government intrusion into their privacy. A vigorous First
Amendment, for example, permits individuals the privacy of their own
thoughts, beliefs, and associations. The Third Amendment keeps govern-
ment soldiers from being quartered in private homes. The Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment
restricts government from interfering with private property, provides for
due process and compensation when it does so, and protects citizens from
self-incrimination. Collectively, these and other provisions of the Consti-
tution impose extraordinary limits on government authority to intrude on
32. FRED H. CATE & RICHARD J. VARN, THE PUBLIC RECORD: INFORMATION PRIVACY AND
AccEss-A NEw FRAMEWORK FOR FINDING THE BALANCE 10 (1999), available at
<http://www.cspra.orglehie%20Publice/20Record.pdf>.
33. Id. at 13.
34. See Clyattv. United States, 197 U.S. 207,216-220 (1905).
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private property, compel testimony, or interfere with practices closely re-
lated to individual beliefs, such as protest, marriage, family planning, or
worship.
Three related points are worth noting. The first is that the extent of
that protection is determined by the type of balancing reflected in the first
principle. The Supreme Court has long asked in the context of Fourth
Amendment challenges to government searches and/or seizures: What ex-
pectation of privacy is implicated by access and how reasonable is that
expectation? When evaluating wiretaps and other seizures of private in-
formation, the Court has inquired into whether the data subject in fact ex-
pected that the information was private and whether that expectation was
reasonable in the light of past experience and widely shared community
values.3 5 The law only protects expectations of privacy that are real and
reasonable.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit highlighted this very
point in its decision striking down the 1994 Driver's Privacy Protection
Act 6 The court wrote, first, that "neither the Supreme Court nor this
Court has ever found a constitutional right to privacy with respect to the
type of information found in motor vehicle records. Indeed, this is the very
sort of information to which individuals do not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 37 Second, the court found that it would be unreasonable
to prevent the disclosure of such information because "the same type of
information is available from numerous other sources.... As a result, an
individual does not have a reasonable expectation that the information is
confidential... .,3' Finally, the court concluded that "such information is
commonly provided to private parties.... We seriously doubt that an in-
dividual has a ... right to privacy in information routinely shared with
strangers .... 239
In the context of information held by the government, the law has tra-
ditionally balanced access and privacy by providing for disclosure of all
information held by the government, except where such disclosure would
offend a specific, enumerated privacy interest. The federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), for example, requires disclosure of all records
other than (1) "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
35. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Star. 2099-2102 (1994) (codified at 18 US.C. §§ 2721-2725
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
37. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd on oter grounds, Reno v. Con-





vacy," and (2) records compiled for law enforcement purposes "to the
extent that the production of such [information] ... could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
' l
Under the FOIA, these records may be withheld if the agency believes that
the privacy risk justifies it. The laws of the states and the District of Co-
lumbia follow a similar pattern: disclosure is the rule; privacy is an excep-
tion.
Second, as the appellate court's language suggests, one longstanding
corollary of the principle that the law should protect as "private" only in-
formation that one actually and reasonably believes is private, is the con-
cept that private should necessarily mean "nonpublic." No expectation of
privacy may be reasonable if it involves information that is routinely dis-
closed or available publicly.
The third point that should be noted is that the high level of privacy
protection is directed only against government, not private, incursions.
This does not mean that there is not, or should not, be any protection from
invasions of privacy carried out by private parties, but it does suggest that
such incursions are less constitutionally suspect than government actions.
There are a variety of possible explanations for this. One focuses on the
power of the government to compel disclosure of information, and the fact
that individuals have no alternative but to comply: the market, which can
reflect consumer demand for privacy, does not apply to information proc-
essing by the government. So laws may be necessary to control govern-
ment invasions of privacy that are not necessary in the private sector.
Another explanation is the constitutional importance of open flows of
information. Regulating privacy in the private sector necessarily means
interfering with information flows, something the Supreme Court is his-
torically loathe to allow.
Still another explanation is the recognition that restricting the power of
one citizen to engage in activity that might be construed as invading the
privacy of another may simply impose too great a cost on citizens indi-
vidually and collectively. Again, this is not to suggest that there is no
value in privacy or no legal protection for privacy in the private sector.
One of the cornerstones of the American legal system is respect for private
property: the laws that attend private property are what empower one per-
son to exclude another from her land and home and papers and posses-
sions, and to call upon the State to protect those objects from physical in-
trusion and interference.
But I believe this does reflect the understanding that privacy is not an
unmitigated good. Protecting the privacy of information imposes real costs
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
41. Id § 552(b)(7)(C).
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on individuals and institutions. Judge Richard Posner has written:
Much of the demand for privacy... concerns discreditable infor-
mation, often information concerning past or present criminal ac-
tivity or moral conduct at variance with a person's professed moral
standards. And often the motive for concealment is... to mislead
those with whom he transacts. Other private information that peo-
ple wish to conceal, while not strictly discreditable, would if re-
vealed correct misapprehensions that the individual is trying to ex-
ploit... 42
Privacy facilitates the dissemination of false information, protects the
withholding of relevant true information, and interferes with the collection,
organization, and storage of information on which businesses and others
can draw to make rapid, informed decisions. The costs of privacy include
both transactional costs incurred by information users seeking to determine
the accuracy and completeness of the information they receive, and the risk
of future losses resulting from inaccurate and incomplete information.
Privacy, therefore, may reduce productivity, lead to higher prices for prod-
ucts and services, and make some services untenable altogether. The pro-
tection of privacy may also interfere with other constitutional values, such
as the protection for expression in the First Amendment and the protection
for private property in the Fifth Amendment.
As a practical matter, virtually none of us wants as much privacy for
others as we do for ourselves. When we hire people to take care of our
children, few of us are very interested in the caregivers' privacy rights.
When we board an airplane, we do not want the pilots to have extensive
privacy rights. The Supreme Court has long lent an unsympathetic ear to
individuals seeking redress from the government against other individuals'
collection and use of information. When privacy rights conflict with free
expression rights before the Court, the latter prevail, virtually without ex-
ception. When information is true and obtained lawfully, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the State may not restrict its publication
without showing a very closely tailored, compelling governmental interest.
Under this requirement, the Court has struck down laws restricting the
publication of confidential [overnment reports, 3 and of the names of
judges under investigation," juvenile suspects45 and rape victims. 6
Moreover, there is no recovery for invasion of privacy unless the informa-
42. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Priacy, 12 GA. L REV. 393,399 (1978).
43. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
44. See Landmark Communicaions, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
45. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).




tion published is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and either false47
or not newsworthy. 8 The dominance of the free expression interests over
the privacy interests is so great that Peter Edelman has written:
[T]he Court [has] virtually extinguished privacy plaintiffs' chances
of recovery for injuries caused by truthful speech that violates their
interest in nondisclosure.... If the right to publish private infor-
mation collides with an individual's right not to have that informa-
tion published, the Court consistently subordinates the privacy in-
terest to the free speech concerns.49
These stricture apply irrespective of whether the speaker is an individ-
ual or an institution. Even wholly commercial expression is protected by
the First Amendment. The Court has found that such expression, if about
lawful activity and not misleading, is protected from government intrusion
unless the government can demonstrate a "substantial" public interest, and
that the intrusion "directly advances""° that interest and is "narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired objective."51 The Court does not characterize
expression as "commercial"--and therefore subject government regula-
tions concerning it to "intermediate scrutiny"--just because it occurs in a
commercial context. The speech of corporations is routinely accorded the
highest First Amendment protection----"strict scrutiny" review-unless the
Court finds that the purpose of the expression is to propose a commercial
transaction or that the expression occurs in the context of a regulated in-
dustry or market (such as the securities exchanges) and concerns activities
which are, in fact, being regulated (the sale of securities).5 3 Even if con-
sidered commercial, such expression is still accorded intermediate scrutiny,
requiring that the government's interest be "important or substantial" and
that the regulation be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." 4
What we are left with, then, is a complicated and, outside of the con-
text of government action, restrictive view of privacy.
D. The Concept of Harm
One of the key elements used when balancing privacy with other inter-
ests is the concept of harm. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
47. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
48. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536.
49. Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L.
REv. 1195,1198 (1990).
50. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,566 (1980).
51. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480 (1989).
52. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
53. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
54. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968).
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the law should restrict information flows to protect privacy only when a
specific harm is actually threatened. When information poses a demon-
strable harm, we measure the value of that flow of information against the
severity of the harm threatened, and in some instances allow the legal sys-
tem to restrict the flow of information to protect against that harm, but only
where a specific harm is threatened. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit recently struck down the Federal Communication Commis-
sion's rules requiring that telephone companies obtained affirmative con-
sent from their customers before using data about their customers' calling
patterns to market products or services to them. The court wrote:
In the context of a speech restriction imposed to protect privacy by
keeping certain information confidential, the government must
show that the dissemination of the information desired to be kept
private would inflict specific and significant harm on individuals,
such as undue embarrassment, ridicule or intimidation or harass-
ment, or misappropriation of sensitive personal information for the
purposes of assuming another's identity. Although we may feel
uncomfortable knowing that our personal information is circulating
in the world, we live in an open society where information may
usually pass freely. A general level of discomfort from knowing
that people can readily access information about us does not neces-
sarily rise to the level of substantial state interest under Central
Hudson [the test applicable to commercial speech] for it is not
based on an identified harm.55
The harm principle is a very significant issue for at least three reasons.
One is that we have historically required that there be a realistic possibility
of harm to justify regulation. If there is no harm threatened, then what is
the justification for the regulation, especially if the regulation interferes
with the free flow of information? Second, the effectiveness vith which a
law prevents or remedies a specific harm is the measure of that law's suc-
cess and the basis for determining whether new laws are necessary. Fi-
nally, if you cannot identify a specific harm, it raises the specter that there
may be some other, undisclosed purpose--unrelated to the supposed
harm-motivating the regulation. So the harm principle is at the very core
of our evaluation of privacy interests.
E. Preference for Self-Help
The fifth and final principle reflects the longstanding preference for
private, market-based solutions, especially to issues involving information.
There are many reasons for this. One is a general distrust of government.
Jane Kirtley, former Executive Director of the Reporters Committee for
55. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (cmphasis added).
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Freedom of the Press, has written that the expectation that the government
will protect privacy "ignore[s], or repudiate[s], an important aspect of the
American democratic tradition: distrust of powerful central government...
[W]hen it comes to privacy, Americans generally do not assume that the
government necessarily has citizens' best interests at heart." 56 I believe
this undergirds the Supreme Court's preference for self-help remedies
where information harms are involved. As noted, the Court has repeatedly
interpreted the First Amendment to deny plaintiffs aggrieved by even false
and harmful speech any remedy, stressing instead, in the words of Justice
Brandeis, that "the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced si-
lence."
57
But I believe this principle also reflects the belief that nongovernmen-
tal measures often provide more effective and sensitive means for protect-
ing privacy. This has certainly proved true in the case of privacy, where
considerable protection is available through the use of technologies, mar-
kets, industry self-regulation and competitive behavior, and individual
judgment. For example, technological innovations such as adjustable pri-
vacy protection settings in both Netscape and Microsoft Explorer, encryp-
tion software, anonymous remailers, and, in fact, the Internet itself all fa-
cilitate privacy and individual control over the information we disclose
about ourselves. The widespread availability, increased power, and de-
creased price of many technologies also facilitate a vibrant market for pri-
vacy protection, whether in the form of online privacy certifications like
BBBOn-line and TrustE, or complete privacy protecting services like the
recently unveiled iPfivacy, that make it possible for an individual to
browse, make purchases online, and even ship goods to her home or a
drop-off location without ever disclosing her real identity, address, e-mail
address, or credit card number to anyone. These technologies can actually
and completely protect privacy in a way that the law cannot.
In addition, many companies are actively competing for customers by
promoting their privacy policies and practices. If enough consumers de-
mand better privacy protection and back up that demand, if necessary, by
withdrawing their patronage, virtually all competitive industry sectors are
certain to respond to that market demand. In fact, consumer inquiries
about, and response to, corporate privacy policies are an excellent measure
of how much the society really values privacy.
Many industry associations have adopted privacy standards and princi-
ples. Corporate compliance with privacy standards constitutes an increas-
ingly important accolade in competitive markets. Moreover, industry asso-
56. Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection and the First Amendment: Why a "Press Exemption"
Won't Work, 80 IoWA L. REv. 639, 648-49 (1995).
57. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also 44 LIq-
uormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,498 (1996); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,419 (1989).
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ciations can help persuade member organizations to adopt and adhere to
industry norms for privacy protection. The majority of the individual ref-
erence services group industry has agreed to abide by the IRSG Principles,
which not only establish data protection standards, but also require annual
compliance audits by third parties and a commitment not to provide infor-
mation to entities whose practices are inconsistent with the IRSG Princi-
ples.58
These more flexible, more contextual, more specific tools often pro-
vide better privacy protection than broad laws, and that protection is
achieved at potentially lower cost to consumers, businesses, and the society
as a whole. These responses are exactly what we would expect from the
market if consumers value privacy protection in the private sector.
III. THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED
These five principles-the requirement that government restrictions on
information be balanced on an individual basis, taking into account the
value of open information flows, the limited understanding of privacy ap-
plied to the private sector (requiring, at minimum, that the privacy interest
be real and reasonable), the focus on specific harms, and the broad prefer-
ence for individual action and self-help--reflect more than a half-century
of judicial thinking, yet they are more relevant than ever as technologies
give individuals new power to communicate, to access, and to use infor-
mation.
I think that Congress's recent legislation imposing an "opt-in" system
on state DMV records demonstrates these principles' continuing vitality.
When judged against these principles, the bill establishes a "privacy norm"
that, far from being "effective" and "positive,"59 is weak, duplicitous, ex-
pensive, and politically expedient.
The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA)6 was enacted by
Congress as part of a package of anti-crime legislation6' in response to the
1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer. Schaeffer had been killed by
an obsessed fan who reportedly obtained her address, through a private
investigator, from her California DMV record. The law prohibits state
DMVs and their employees from releasing "personal information" from
any person's driver's record, unless the request fits within any of fourteen
58. See FTC, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1997), anlabe at
<httpJ/www.ftc.gov/bcplprivacy/lshp971irsdocl.htm>.
59. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 857.
60. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099-2102 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)).
61. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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exemptions, 62 including, for example, use by any government agency,63
insurance company,64 or licensed private investigator; any use related to
vehicle safety, emissions, or research;66 and any use at all if the relevant
DMV has provided drivers with the opportunity to waive their statutory
rights in non-disclosure, i.e., to "opt-out." 67 The Drivers Privacy Protec-
tion Act took effect three years later, in 1994, by which time a majority of
states had enacted their own laws complying with the Act, including "opt-
out" provisions. (A number of states also challenged the constitutionality
of the law, arguing that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to
compel them to regulate access to their state records. On January 12, 2000,
the Supreme Court determined that Congress did possess the necessary
authority.68 )
The Drivers Privacy Protect Act had been in effect only two years,
however, when Senate Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), Chairman of the Senate
Transportation Committee, introduced a last-minute amendment to the
1999 Transportation Appropriations Act.69  The amendment eliminated
federal highway funds for states that do not require affirmative "opt-in"
consent from individuals before information about them contained in
driver's and motor vehicle records is used for "surveys, marketing, or so-
licitation" purposes, thus reversing the position taken by Congress in 1994.
With billions of highway funds at stake, no member of Congress wanted to
challenge the powerful committee chairman, and the following week,
without hearings or opportunity for public comment on the amendment, the
bill passed.
No one would argue that this is good legislative process, but it is not
unusual for Congress, and good laws have been enacted before through
deficient processes. But is this a good law? Is the privacy norm it estab-
lishes "effective" and "positive" in light of the five principles identified
earlier?
The law certainly reflects a balance: Congress did not prohibit the dis-
closure of state DMV records for marketing and solicitation purposes, it
merely required states to adopt affirmative "opt-in" consent before allow-
ing those records to be used for such purposes. The limited record does not
suggest that the Appropriations Committees of either the House or the Sen-
ate engaged in any explicit balancing, however, trying to reconcile the need
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
63. See id. § 2721(b)(1).
64. See id. §§ 2721(b)(6), (9).
65. See Id. § 2721(b)(8).
66. See id. § 2721(b)(2).
67. See Id. § 272 1(b)(1 1).
68. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671-72 (2000).
69. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000 § 350,
Pub. L. No. 106-69; 113 Stat. 986 (1999).
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for the restriction with its costs.7 In fact, anecdotal reports suggest that
when the Conference Committee charged with reconciling the House and
Senate versions of the Transportation Appropriations bill first considered
the Shelby amendment, it was initially opposed by every member, until
Senator Shelby threatened to stall the entire bill if the amendment was not
included. In any event, there is no record of a specific, individualized bal-
ance.
Does the amendment further open information flows? Hardly. Of
course, that will be true of most, if not all, laws designed to protect privacy.
However, recall that the Shelby amendment replaced the existing "opt-out'
system for such uses of DMV records with an "opt-in" system. Both sys-
tems give citizens the final, absolute say about the use of DMV data about
them. The major difference between the two is that, without providing for
any greater privacy protection, "opt-in" imposes a far greater restriction on
information use, because of the lethargy of most citizens and the practical
difficulty of would-be users of information (typically businesses, charities,
and alumni/ae organizations that use drivers' license data for marketing
and surveys) contacting individuals to obtain their "opt-in" as opposed to
concerned individuals contacting organizations (which maintain 800-
numbers and fixed addresses and business hours) to express their "opt-
out." The amendment, therefore, imposes a greater obstacle to information
flows without achieving any greater privacy protection.
Moreover, "opt-in" systems interfere with information flows in another
important way: they raise the cost of communicating. Companies that seek
to use personal information to enter new markets, target their marketing
efforts, and improve customer service must rebuild the pipeline by con-
tacting one customer at a time to gain their permission to use information.
Consequently, an "opt-in" system for giving consumers control over in-
formation usage is always more expensive than an "opt-out" system. "Opt-
in" requires that every consumer be contacted to gain explicit permission.
Under "opt-out," contact only occurs for those consumers who wish to
withhold permission. "Opt-in" is more costly precisely because it fails to
harness the efficiency of having customers reveal their own preferences as
opposed to having to explicitly ask them.
Consider the experience of U.S. West, one of the few U.S. companies
to test an "opt-in" system. In obtaining permission to utilize information
about its customers' calling patterns (e.g., volume of calls, time and dura-
tion of calls, etc.), the company found that an "opt-in" system was signifi-
cantly more expensive to administer, costing almost thirty dollars per cus-
tomer contacted. 71 To gain permission to use such information for mar-
70. See id.
71. See Brief for Petitioner and Intervenors at 15-16, U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F3d 1224 (10th
Cir. 1999) (No. 98-9518).
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keting, U.S. West determined that it required an average of 4.8 calls to
each customer household before they reached an adult who could grant
consent.72 In one-third of households called, U.S. West never reached the
customer, despite repeated attempts.73 Consequently, customers received
more calls than in an "opt-out" system, and many customers were denied
opportunities to receive information about valuable new products and
services.
The Shelby amendment also fails to reflect the historical understanding
of privacy reflected in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, in that it applies
to an expectation of privacy that I doubt is real and I am certain is not rea-
sonable. DMV records have been available to the public virtually without
limit since their inception. Even under the DPPA, the permitted uses of
those records are vast. Moreover, since the DPPA took effect in 1997,
DMVs in the majority of states have displayed notices informing citizens
that their records are available for any purpose if they do not "opt-out" of
that availability. It therefore seems unlikely that most people thought those
records were confidential and even if that was the expectation of some, it
was patently unreasonable.
Moreover, while the Shelby amendment applies to government infor-
mation use, it only restricts one government use of these data-providing
them to private parties for marketing or solicitation. The government is
still free to collect whatever data it wishes and to use it in any way not
regulated by the DPPA or the Shelby amendment. The amendment im-
poses a far greater restraint on private sector use of data, for example, for
alumni associations to locate members, for charities to raise funds, and for
direct marketing solicitations. And that restraint comes with no additional
privacy protection; the citizens have no greater privacy rights than we did
under "opt-out."
Closely related to these concerns is the clear incongruity of the Shelby
amendment with the fourth principle-the concept of harm. What is the
harm that the Shelby amendment is designed to protect against? Direct
marketing? To be sure, few Americans claim to like direct marketing, but
more than two-thirds of U.S. consumers-132 million adults-took ad-
vantage of direct marketing opportunities in 1998, 74 accounting for more
than $1.3 trillion in sales of goods and services.75 The Direct Marketing
Association has long provided a convenient way for consumers to "opt-
out" of the use of their personal information by member companies, but
72. See id. at 16.
73. See id.
74. See DIREcT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIC IMPACT: U.S. DIRECT MARKETING TODAY
(4th ed. 1998).




fewer than three percent of U.S. adults avail themselves of that opportu-
nity. The conclusion is inescapable: the vast majority of the public does
not believe that direct marketing poses a demonstrable harm.
Finally, does the Shelby amendment reflect the preference for self-help
and individual action that we have long favored? The answer is clearly no,
especially since it creates a presumption that is contrary to demonstrated
consumer behavior, and it substitutes an "opt-in" system for one that al-
lowed citizens to "opt-out" of the use of DMV information about ihem for
direct marketing.
In sum, the DPPA-which, to be fair, Professor Schwartz only uses as
a passing example of a practical application of "constituitive privacy"-
strikes me as a poor demonstration of the advantages of the more subtle
and sensitive, "shifting, multidimensional" understanding of privacy that
Professor Schwartz is proposing. Quite the contrary, this scenario suggests
that "opt-in" laws will rarely, if ever, be justified, however we define pri-
vacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
We need to take privacy seriously. My point is not at all to suggest
that privacy is not a real issue; rather, it is to suggest that the political proc-
ess thus far has not treated it as one. Where the collection and use of non-
public, personal information poses a real risk of a serious harm, Congress
should enact well-drafted, carefully targeted legislation. For example,
rather than worry about the use of public information to market valuable
products and services, I would like to see Congress consider the issue of
whether the mass of information stored in commercial databases is used on
an individual basis, for example, when one enterprising snoop obtained
Judge Robert Bork's video rental records following his nomination to the
Supreme Court. This type of individual use of information, as opposed to
broad use for marketing, raises serious issues that Congress has not yet
addressed.
Moreover, not all privacy issues require government action. As dis-
cussed above, nongovernmental solutions, which are often best facilitated
by government inaction, are the most effective and appropriate protections
for privacy. But there can be no doubt that privacy involves real issues and
we must consider them seriously, whether or not that consideration ulti-
mately leads to legislation or regulation.
What we are increasingly witnessing is Congress and state legislatures
responding to a politically popular issue with poor policy and with poor
process. There are regrettably many examples of this. Absence of pre-
emption is perhaps the best one. If Congress really cared about privacy, it
would not have allowed every state to enact its own set of privacy stan-
dards. The DPPA provides another sad example. Supposedly enacted in
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response to the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, who was stalked
by an obsessed fan using information provided by a private investigator
from her California DMV record, the law restricts the public's access to
motor vehicle records, but not that of private investigators.
California provides another all-too-common example. In an effort to
protect privacy, California enacted a statute that prohibited the use of ar-
restee addresses obtained from law enforcement agencies for marketing
products or services, but explicitly permitted such information to be used
for "journalistic" purposes. 6 It is difficult to take seriously the State's
claim that sending a letter to an arrestee offering the services of an attorney
or private investigator would invade her privacy, while publishing her
name and address in the newspaper would not. This "overall irrationality,"
as Justice Stevens called it in his dissent from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion upholding the constitutionality of the statute, "eviscerate[s] any ra-
tional basis for believing that the Amendment will truly protect the privacy
of these persons."
77
The flood of legislation and regulation suggests that this important
subject, which touches on core values at the heart of our democracy and
economy, is not getting the thoughtful consideration that it needs. As a
result, everybody suffers. Privacy suffers because these ill-considered laws
do not provide effective privacy protection. The economy suffers because
these restrictions act as a tax, slowing the economy and eroding the bene-
fits of open information flows. And, most importantly, we as individuals
and as a society suffer.
76. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 2000).
77. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting, 120 S. Ct. 483, 492-93 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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